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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, 
These three consolidated cases are appeals by the State of Idaho, Department of Health 
and Welfare (the "Department") from the decisions of the district court reversing an 
administrative hearing officer's and the Department Director's orders, which affirmed the 
Department's reimbursement decisions for North Idaho Behavioral Health, the inpatient 
psychiatric care unit of Kootenai Medical Center ("KMC"). The District Court, sitting in its 
judicial-review capacity under the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (IAPA), Idaho Code $5 
67-5201-5292, reversed the hearing officer's decisions after striking (1) the entire testimony of 
the State's only witness and (2) the findings and conclusions of the peer reviewing psychiatrist. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
These cases stem from three administrative hearings: Case No. 34881 involves patient 
J.M.; Case No. 34879 involves patient T.K.; and Case No. 34880 involves patient J.G. These 
patients were determined to be Medicaid eligible after they were discharged from the Hospital, 
whereupon KMC sought retrospective review and certification for Medicaid reimbursement. 
KMC requested an administrative hearing in all three cases, challenging the reimbursement 
determinations made by Qualis Health, the Department's Quality Improvement Organization 
(QIO), which makes Medicaid reimbursement certification decisions for the Department. 
Patient J.M., a 16-year-old male was hospitalized at KMC between August 15 and 
August 31, 2005, having been admitted because he had cut his wrists affer a fight with his 
girlfriend and because he had made threats of suicide in the past. R., Ex. 7 (Respondent's 
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Disclosure, Ex. B), p. 8. J.M. was not placed on psychiatric medication prior to this 
hospitalization. R., Ex. 7, p. 11. Upon admission, the patient was diagnosed with depression 
through a psychiatric evaluation. R., Ex. 7, pp. 10-13. Initiation of psychiatric medication 
(Remeron) was delayed until August 25, 2005, due to the attending psychiatrist's desire to first 
obtain the results of a psychological evaluation. R., Ex. 7, pp. 15, 46-50. KMC never 
considered J.M. gravely disabled and, as of August 23, 2005, J.M. denied any thoughts of 
wishing to harm himself or others. R., Ex. 7, pp. 42-51. On August 27, J.M. was placed on a 
pass and allowed to leave the Hospital under his mother's care. R., Ex. 7, p. 44. During that 
furlough, the patient used marijuana, causing his stay to be extended until August 31,2005 when 
he was discharged. R., Ex. 7, p. 15. 
After retrospective review of the entire medical record by the State's peer review 
organization, Medicaid approved reimbursement for the first (5) five days of the patient's stay, 
through a discharge date of August 25,2005. R., Ex. 1 (Transcript of Hearing), p. 5,11:16-17, p. 
70, 11: 10-2 1; Ex. 7, p. 6. Medicaid's decision was based on the lack of documentation that after 
that date J.M. was a danger to himself or others, or was gravely disabled, so as to require acute 
inpatient care. R., Ex. 1; Ex. 7, pp. 5-6. The reviewers found that there was sufficient 
information available to KMC to begin medication without such extended delay and that 
withholding medication while awaiting the results of psychological testing was not medically 
justified. R., Ex. I ;  Ex. 7, pp. 5-6. 
Patient T.K. is a 19-year-old female suffering from chronic paranoid schizophrenia, was 
admitted to KMC and placed on an involuntary mental hold by KMC on November 6, 2005. 
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The police had removed the patient from a women's shelter because of the concern over her 
bizarre and uncommunicative behavior. R., Ex. 11 (Respondent's Disclosure, Exhibit C), pp. 10, 
12. The administrative hold was released on November 9, 2005, after T.K. agreed to stay at the 
Hospital and began working with staff. R., Ex. 11, p. 19. T.K., who had been hospitalized on 
several prior occasions, remained in the Hospital through December 14, 2005. R., Ex 11, pp. 
10, 12. She refused her medications on November 15 and was again placed on administrative 
hold. R., Ex. 11, pp. 23-24. From November 19 through December 12, T.K. was placed in the 
Department's custody, but because no beds were available in the State Hospital, she remained at 
KMC. R., Ex. 1, p. 22,11:3-7; p. 23, 11:9-22; Ex. 11, pp. 17,67, 170. Discharge planning did not 
begin until December 9, when T.K. became eligible for Medicaid. R., Ex. 1, p. 22, 11:7-13 - p. 
23,ll: 18-20; EX. 1 1, pp. 56-67. 
Medicaid paid for the initial three-days of the hospital stay; state non-Medicaid funds 
were paid for the hospitalization from November 19 through December 12. R., Ex. 11, pp. 5-6; 
Ex. 5, p. 2, fn. 1. There was no reimbursement to KMC for the period November 9 through 18, 
or for December 13 and 14, when KMC was attempting to find placement for T.K. in a group 
home. R., Ex. 1, p. 28, 11:15-18; Ex. 5 (Preliminary Order), p. 2, fn. 1; Ex. 11, pp. 54-57, 67. 
The denial of reimbursement was made for the dates in question after retrospective review of the 
entire medical record. Denial was based on the lack of documentation of medical necessity 
criteria for continuing inpatient psychiatric hospitalization for both periods of time and on the 
fact that a portion of the extended stay was based solely on KMC's difficulty in finding a 
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suitable discharge environment for the patient. R., Ex. 1, p. 6,1:24 - p.7, I:] 1; p. 10,1:7 - p. 17, 
1:24; p. 44,1:4 - p. 56,1:17; EX. 11, pp. 5-6. 
Patient J.G. is a 14-year-old female, who was transfened from a juvenile detention center 
to KMC on December 23, 2005. She was admitted to KMC because she had made suicidal 
statements, had a prior history of self-injurious behavior, and had failed to engage in outpatient 
care. R., Ex. 12 (Respondent's Disclosure, Exhibit C), p. 10. Psychological testing was ordered 
in the first few days of her stay, but was not completed until January 1, 2006. R., Ex. 12, pp. 24, 
44-52. Results of the testing were not available until January 3, 2006. R., Ex. 12, p. 43-44. 
Medication was not administered to J.G. during her hospital stay. She was discharged on January 
4, 2006, and transfened back to the detention center. R., Ex. 12, pp. 10-1 1. As of January 1, 
2006, J.G. denied any suicidal ideation. R., Ex. 12, pp. 43-45. 
After retrospective review of the entire medical record, Medicaid paid for the first five 
(5) days of care and denied reimbursement for this patient's hospitalization from December 28 
through discharge on January 4, 2006. R., Ex. I, p. I4,11:16-17; p. 52,11:14-16; Ex. 12, pp. 4-5. 
The denied payment was based largely on the following: (1) psychological testing was not 
necessary to diagnose the patient or to initiate psychiatric medication and unnecessarily delayed 
discharge; (2) no psychiatric medication was initiated during the patient's stay, even though the 
patient's mother was available for consent to medication during at least three visits to her child; 
and (3) no evidence was presented in the medical record as to why the patient could not have 
been kept safe from self harm in detention. R., Ex. 12, pp. 4-5. 
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C. Course of Proceedings Below. 
Administrative hearings were conducted on August 3, 2006, in the T.K. case; on August 
14, 2006 in the J.M. case; and on November 30, 2006 in the J.G. case. The Department's 
reimbursement decisions were affirmed in a11 three cases by the hearing officer, whose decisions 
were affirmed upon petition for review by the Department's Director. KMC's petitions for 
judicial review were assigned to the Honorable John T. Mitchell, District Judge, whereupon each 
case was individually briefed by the Parties. Oral argument was presented to the district court 
concerning the petitions on September 13, 2007. The district court rendered its Memorandum 
Decision and Order on Appeal on October 30,2007. 
11. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the hearing officer's Preliminary Orders are supported by substantial 
evidence in the record. 
2. Whether the district court erred in striking the written comments of the QIO peer 
reviewer, who did not testify, based on the premise that due process afforded KMC the right to 
cross-examine the peer reviewer at the administrative hearing under 42 CFR §§ 431.200, et seq. 
and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 US 254 (1970), where the sole issue at hearing is reimbursement to 
the provider. 
3. Whether the district court erred in striking the testimony of the Department's only 
witness based solely on the witness's lack of familiarity with services in the area that were less 
intensive than inpatient psychiatric care, where that witness was the first reviewing physician for 
the QIO; where knowledge of which less intensive services are available in the area is not part of 
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the QIO's review function; and where KMC made no showing of any attempt to secure less 
intensive services for the patient within the timeframe authorized by the QIO for reimbursement. 
4. Whether the district court erred in ruling that the evidence to be considered by 
the hearing officer may not be limited to that evidence which was made available to the agency 
or its agent before the agency's decision was rendered, where KMC made no showing of good 
cause as to why such evidence was not made available to the agency or its agent before its 
decision was rendered. 
5. Whether the district court erred in ruling that KMC had standing to assert the 
rights of the patients in question where the actual patients were not denied services, were not 
aggrieved otherwise by the Department's reimbursement decision, and sought no administrative 
or other review of such decision. 
6. Whether the district court erred in ruling that IDAPA 16.03.09.079.05 (Idaho 
Administrative Code, July 2005, Volume 4) conflicts with 42 CFR 4 441.152 by requiring that 
providers present documentation sufficient to demonstrate that criteria for an extended length of 
stay are met. 
7. Whether the Department should be granted attorney fees and costs, pursuant to 
Idaho Code 4 12-1 17, and I.R.C.P. 54(d), (e), since all the legal authority relied upon by KMC is 
either inapplicable to the facts of the case, or, contrary to KMC's assertion below, not in conflict 
with the Department rules and State statutes governing Department reimbursement decisions and 
administrative hearing procedure. 
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111. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of judicial review over an action taken by an administrative agency is 
established by Idaho Code $67-5279. An agency's decision must be affirmed unless it (a) 
violates constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) exceeds the agency's statutory authority; (c) is 
made upon unlawful procedure; (d) is not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a 
whole; or (e) is arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. Idaho Code 3 67-5279(3). "If the 
agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and remanded for further 
proceedings as necessary." Idaho Code § 67-5279(3). "A strong presumption of validity favors 
an agency's actions." Young Electric Sign Co., v. State ex rel. Winder, 135 Idaho 804, 807,25 
P.3d 117, 120 (2001). The court "shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the 
weight of the evidence on questions of fact." Section 67-5279(1). See also Chisholm v. Idaho 
Dep't of Wafer Resources, 142 Idaho 159, 162, 125 P.3d 515,518, (2005). A court instead must 
"defer to the agency's findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous and 
unsupported by the evidence in the record." Young Elect. Sign, 135 Idaho at 807, 25 P.3d at 
120. 
A showing of error is a necessary but not sufficient basis for setting aside an 
administrative decision. The party contesting the agency's decision must first show how the 
agency "erred in a manner specified in Idaho Code § 67-5279(3), and then establish that a 
substantial right has been prejudiced." Barron v. Idaho Dep't of Water Resources, 135 Idaho 
414,417, 18 P.3d 219,221 (2001). Even if the agency violated a provision of Idaho Code 3 67- 
5279(3)e, the appellate court must affirm the agency decision "unless substantial rights of the 
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appellant have been prejudiced." Idaho Code 5 67-5279(4); Brett v. Eleventh St. Dockowner's 
Ass'n, Inc., 141 Idaho 517,521, 112 P.3d 805,809 (2005). 
This Court determines the propriety of the district court's judgments with respect to the 
validity of the Department's Medicaid determinations by conducting an independent review of 
the administrative record in accordance with the standards described above. Employers Res. 
Mgmt. Co. v. Dep't oflns., 143 Idaho 179, 182, 141 P.3d 1048, 1051 (2006). All other issues 
concerning the district court's judgments are questions of law subject to free review. .Hall v. 
Farmers Alliance Mzif. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 313, 179 P.3d 276 (Idaho 2008). 
1V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Preliminary Orders and the Final Orders were not in violation of Idaho Code 5 67- 
5279(3), and no substantial right of KMC was prejudiced by those Orders, as required to have 
been found by the district court pursuant to ldaho Code $ 67-5279(4). Neither the Preliminary 
Orders nor the Director's Final Order were made in violation of constitutional or statutory 
provisions; rather they were based on a careful and reasoned analysis of the rules at issue and 
were supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. These orders were within the 
statutory authority vested in the hearing officer and Director, and based upon lawful procedure, 
as outlined in the Contested Case Rules at IDAPA 16.05.03, et seq and ldaho Code 5 67-5243. 
Further, the orders were not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion, but rather the rational 
result of reasonable analysis and construction of the rules at play. 
The case law in the Ninth Circuit demonstrates that Medicaid providers have no 
protectable property interest in Medicaid payments; and only a limited protectable liberty interest 
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which, is not applicable in this case. Thus, no substantial right can have been prejudiced by the 
Department's payment decision. 
Neither is KMC, as a provider, entitled to the same due process protections as are 
Medicaid beneficiaries. Even if it were a beneficiary, it would not be entitled to cross-examine a 
QIO peer reviewer, since such reviewers' identities are confidential by federal law, unless they 
supply written consent to disclosure. Medicaid agencies must be permitted to present evidence 
of the QIO peer reviewers' findings and conclusions without their presence at hearing, in order to 
comply with federal requirements concerning reviewer confidentiality and Medicaid spending 
oversight. 
The district court should not have stricken the testimony of the Department's only 
witness. Awareness of the availability of less intensive senices in the area of the hospital is not 
part of the QIO review function. The availability of less restrictive alternatives for admission is 
determined by the Department, and availability of such resources during continued stay is part of 
the hospital's discharge planning responsibilities. Delay of discharge due to diffjculties in 
securing placement is not a component of medical necessity for purposes of Medicaid 
reimbursement. In any event, the Department's witness and the peer reviewer were aware of the 
pre-arranged discharge location in both the J.M. and J.G. cases. 
Whether KMC has standing to assert the rights of its patients is irrelevant in these cases, 
since the aggrieved party is KMC which has standing to represent itself. The district court's 
speculation that providers may decide in future not to accept Medicaid patients is too great a 
stretch to find associated standing, even if KMC needed it. 
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IDAPA 16.05.03.131 does not violate federal law by impeding a petitioner's ability to 
present its case. The rule allows additional evidence to be considered if the party shows good 
cause as to why the evidence was not made available to the Department or its agent before its 
decision was made. The case must be remanded in such an event. The Hospital in these cases 
was not entitled to present additional evidence at hearing because it made no attempt to show 
good cause and made no request for a remand in any of these cases. 
The documentation requirements in IDAPA 16.03.09.079.05 are not in conflict with 42 
CFR 441,150, et seq. The federal regulations do not prohibit the states from interpreting 
"certify" to be synonymous with documenting the evidence in the medical record to the extent 
necessary to demonstrate medical necessity for care. Since Medicaid and QIO reviewers are not 
typically located on the hospital premises, the states have no way of performing their federally 
required oversight duties if providers are not required to provide documentation suficient to 
demonstrate medical necessity. The documentation required is clearly spelled out in IDAPA 
16.03.09.079. 
As the hearing officer ruled in all three cases below, KMC failed to meet its burden under 
Idaho Code §fi 67-5279(3) and 67-5279(4). None of the Department's record or testimony 
should have been stricken by the district court and the Preliminary and Final Orders should have 
been affirmed. 
Based on the substantial evidence in the records supporting the Preliminary Orders and 
on the controlling state and federal law, particularly in the Ninth Circuit, there is no reasonable 
basis in law or fact for KMC to have petitioned from the hearing officer's decisions in these 
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matters. DHW should therefore be awarded attorney fees and costs, pursuant to Idaho Code 3 
12-1 17 and I.R.C.P. 54(d) and (e). 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. Reimbursement For Acute Inpatient Psychiatric Care Was Not Medically Justified 
Beyond The Approved Dates In Any Of The Three Consolidated Cases. 
The important background to this case is that Medicaid, as with most private medical 
insurance, requires that the covered service be medically necessary and supported by 
documentation in the medical record. 42 USC 5 1320c-3(a)(l); 42 CFR 3 441.152; IDAPA 
16.03.09.079. In compliance with state and federal Medicaid law, the Department, through its 
QIO, performs concurrent, prospective, and retrospective reviews of inpatient hospital stays. 42 
USC 3 1320c-3(a)(l); ,IDAPA 16.03.09.080. Pursuant to 42 USC 5 1320c-7(a), the Department 
has contracted with Qualis Health to perform the QIO review functions for the Department. 
Retrospective reviews of provider reimbursement claims occur when the patient's 
eligibility for Medicaid is determined after discharge from the hospital. Retrospective review 
involves a review of the entire medical record in question by a physician consultant employed by 
Qualis Health. See e.g., R., Ex. 1, p. 14, 11:16-17 (J.G.). If KMC appeals the decision of that 
consultant, the full medical record is then peer reviewed by an outside physician whose specialty 
matches that of the attending physician as closely as possible. See e.g.,  R., Ex. 1, p. 51,1:8 - p. 
52, 120 (J.G.). In these cases, the peer reviewers contracted by Qualis to perform these 
retrospective reviews were psychiatrists in active practice. R., Ex. 1, p. 6,1:15 -p. 7,1:4 (T.K.); 
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R., Ex. 1, p. 5,1:14-17; p. 69,1:22 -p. 70, 1:21 (J.M.); R., Ex. 1, p. 12, 11:8-13; p 50,l: -p. 52, 1:20 
(J. G.). 
In making reimbursement certification determinations, Qualis Health reviewers are 
guided by their clinical training and expertise, and by the Medical Assistance rules in IDAPA 
16.03.09. See e.g., R., Ex. 1, p. 52, 1:21 - p. 53, 1:12 (J.G.). J.M. was admitted for suicidal 
ideation and homicidal ideation. J.G. was admitted for suicidal ideation. T.K. was admitted for 
grave impairment. The medical necessity criteria for inpatient psychiatric admission required to 
be demonstrated by KMC for these conditions are articulated in IDAPA 16.03.09.079.01: 
Medical Necessity Criteria. Both severity of illness and intensity 
of services criteria must be met for admission to an IMD or 
psychiatric unit of a general hospital. 
a. Severity of illness criteria. The child must meet one (1)  of the 
following criteria related to the severity of his psychiatric illness: 
i. Is currently dangerous to self as indicated by at least one (1) of 
the flowing: 
(1) Has actually made an attempt to take his own life in the last 
seventy-two (72) hours (details of the attempt must be 
documented); or 
(2) Has demonstrated self-mutilative behavior within the last 
seventy-two (72) hours (details of the behavior must be 
documented); or 
(3) Has a clear plan to seriously harm himself, overt suicidal intent, 
and lethal means avaiIable to follow the plan (this information can 
be from the child or a reliable source and the details of the child's 
plan must be documented); or 
(4) A mental health professional has information from the child or 
a reliable source that the child has a current plan, specific intent, or 
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recurrent thoughts to seriously harm himself and is at significant 
risk to making an attempt to carry out the plan without immediate 
intervention (details must be documented); or 
ii. Child is actively violent or aggressive and exhibits homicidal 
ideation or other symptoms which indicate he is a probable danger 
to others as indicated by one (1) of the following: 
(1) The child has actually engaged in behavior harmful or 
potentially harmful to others or caused serious damage to property 
which would pose a serious threat of injury or harm to others 
within the last twenty-four (24) hours (description of the behavior 
and extent of injury or damage must be documented, as well as the 
time the behavior occurred relative to the present); or 
(2) The child has made threats to kill or seriously injure others or 
to cause serious damage to property which would pose a threat of 
injury or harm to others and has effective means to carry out the 
threats (details of threats must be documented); or 
(3) A mental health professional has information from the child or 
a reliable source that the child has a current plan, specific intent, or 
recurrent thoughts to seriously harm others or property and is at 
significant risk of making the attempt without immediate 
intervention (details must be documented); or 
iii. Child is gravely impaired as indicated by at least one (1) of the 
following criteria: 
(1) The child has such limited functioning that his physical safety 
and well being are in jeopardy due to his inability for basic self- 
care, judgment and decision making (details of the functional 
limitations must be documented); or 
(2) The acute onset of psychosis or severe thought disorganization 
or clinical deterioration has rendered the child unmanageable and 
unable to cooperate in non-hospital treatment (details of the child's 
behaviors must be documented); or 
(3) There is a need for treatment, evaluation or complex diagnostic 
testing where the child's level of functioning or communication 
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precludes assessment and/or treatment in a non-hospital based 
setting, and may require close supervision of medication and/or 
behavior. 
b. Intensity of service criteria. The child must meet all of the 
following criteria related to the intensity of services needed to treat 
his mental illness: 
i. It is documented by the Regional Mental Health Authority that 
less restrictive services in the community do not exist or do not 
meet the treatment or diagnostic needs of the child, or the child has 
been unresponsive to treatment at a less intensive level of care. 
The services considered, tried and/or needed must be documented: 
and 
ii. The services provided in the hospital can reasonably be 
expected to improve the child's condition or prevent further 
regression so that inpatient services will no longer be needed; and 
iii. Treatment of the child's psychiatric condition requires services 
on an inpatient basis, including twenty-four (24) hour nursing 
observation, under the direction of a psychiatrist. The child 
requiring this treatment must not be eligible for independent passes 
or unit passes without observation or being accompanied by 
hospital personnel or a responsible other. 
IDAPA 16.03.09.079.01. The criteria required to be demonstrated by KMC for 
continued stay after admission is stated in IDAPA 16.03.09.079.05: 
Length of Stay. An initial length of stay will be established by the 
Department or its designee. An initial length of stay will usually 
be for no longer than five (5) days . . . . Approval of additional 
days will be based on the following criteria: 
a. Documentation sufficient to demonstrate the medical necessity 
criteria is still met; and 
b. A plan of care that includes documentation sufficient to 
demonstrate that the child's psychiatric condition continues to 
require sewices which can only be provided on an in-patient basis, 
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including twenty-four (24) hour nursing observation, under the 
direction of a psychiatrist or other physician qualified to treat 
mental disease: and 
c. Documentation sufficient to demonstrate the need for continued 
hospitalization, and that additional days at in-patient level of care 
will inlprove the recipient's condition. 
IDAPA 16.03.09.05. Reimbursement for admission and length of stay in an inpatient psychiatric 
facility is explained in IDAPA 16.03.09.08, which states in pertinent part: 
Payment. Reimbursement for the recipient's admission and length 
of stay is subject to preadmission, concurrent or retrospective 
review by the Department or its designee . . . . If such review 
identifies that an admission or continued stay is not medically 
necessary, then no Medicaid payment will be made . . . . 
c. The recipient may be charged for services only when he or she 
has made an informed decision to incur expenses for services 
deemed not medically necessary by the Department or its designee. 
IDAPA 16.03.09.08. 
After the dates by which Qualis Health determined that the three patients in question 
should have been discharged, the records in all three cases show that none of the severity of 
illness criteria listed in IDAPA 16.03.09.079.01.a continued to be met. Thus, the criterion for 
continued stay under IDAPA 16.03.09.079.05.a was not met in any of these cases, and 
reimbursement was not supported after the dates determined by Qualis Health to have been the 
appropriate discharge dates. Further, the intensity of service criterion in IDAPA 
16.03.09.079.01.b.iii was no longer met in these cases after the date determined by QuaIis Health 
to have been the appropriate discharge date and thus, again, the continued stay criterion in 
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IDAPA 16.03.09.079.05.a was no longer met. R., Ex. 5, pp. 18-21 (T.K.); R., Ex. 5, pp. 25 
(J.M.); R., EX. 5, pp. 25-28 (J.G.) 
Discharge was delayed by psychological testing with respect to both J.M. and J.G. As 
noted by the initial and peer-psychiatrist reviewers for QuaIis Health in both of those cases, 
where a psychiatric evaluation has already been performed, psychological testing is an 
adjunctive tool that may help confirm, but is not necessary for psychiatric diagnosis, and is not 
required before psychiatric medication is initiated. Furthermore, psychological testing can be 
done on an outpatient basis after discharge, and is therefore not a necessary component of acute 
inpatient psychiatric care. See e.g., R., Ex. 1, p. 16, 1:21 - p. 19, 1:lO; Ex. 12, p. 5 (J.G.). Thus, 
as the hearing officer found in each case, the days spent waiting for the results of the 
psychological testing do not meet inpatient psychiatric care criteria under IDAPA 
16.03.09.079.01.b.iii and 16.03.09.079.05.a. and payment for those extra days is inappropriate. 
R., Ex. 5, pp. 22,25; (J.M.), Ex. 5, pp. 25-28 (J.G.). 
J.M. denied suicidal ideation on August 23, 2005, and thereafter displayed none of the 
severity of illness criteria listed in IDAPA 16.03.09.079.01.a. R., Ex. 7 (Respondent's 
Disclosure, Exhibit B), pp. 5-6, 42-51. J.M. "contracted for safety," further reinforcing the lack 
of suicidal intent. Homicidal ideation, recorded in general terms at admission, did not recur. R., 
Ex. 7, pp. 42-51, 99-108. Grave impairment was not asserted by KMC as a basis for patient 
J.M.'s admission or continued stay. By August 24, 2005, the medical record showed that 24- 
hour psychiatric observation was no longer needed, and that criteria for severity of illness, 
intensity of services and continued stay were no longer met. R., Ex. 5, pp. 22,25. 
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As to J.G., none of the criteria for severity of illness was reflected in the medical record 
after December 28, 2005: Indeed, suicidal ideation had been marginal at admission, and she 
expressed only "fairly mild" ideation thereafter. R., Ex. 1, pp. 52, 1:21 -58, 1:9. At no time did 
the patient evidence a specific intent to harm herself. In addition, J.G. would have been returned 
to juvenile detention, which could have provided close observation and ensured her safety. R., 
Ex. 1, p. 58, 11:7-9. Neither homicidal ideation nor grave impairment were raised as bases of 
admission or continued stay by KMC. Twenty-four hour psychiatric observation was not 
needed as of December 28, because the severity of illness criteria no longer existed and the 
patient was discharged back to the detention center. Based on the evidence supplied in the 
medical record, acute care was not required for patient J.G. after December 28, 2005 under the 
continued stay criterion in IDAPA 16.03.09.079.05. R., Ex. 5, pp. 25-28. 
In the matter of T.K., there was no evidence in the extensive medical record 
(approximately 1,000 pages) of homicidal or suicidal thought, chaotic thinking indicating active 
or acute psychosis, or specific evidence of halIucinations. R., Ex. 1 ., pp. 12,1:15 - 13,1:21; pp. 
14,11: 18 -1 7, 1:24; pp. 44, l:l1 - p. 56, I : ]  7; R., Ex. 11, pp. 5-6. The group therapy provided to 
T.K. during this time could have been provided on an outpatient basis. Although the patient was 
encouraged to look at treatment and residence options in the community, on November 9, KMC 
made no documented effort to discharge the patient during this period of time. R., Ex. 1, p. 12, 
1:15-P. 13,1:21;p. 14,1:18-P. 17,1:24;p.44,1:11 -P. 56,1:17;R.,Ex. lI,pp.5-6. 
The Department's medical witness testified that the Kootenai medical notes for T.K. are 
scanty for a 38-day stay, and did not indicate that the patient was in such grave danger as to 
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require acute care between November 9 and 15 and, stated that the patient was showing 
improvement and cooperative behavior. R., Ex. 1, p. 12,1:15 -p. 13,1:21; p. 44,1:11 -p. 56,1:17. 
Because there were questions about her safety at the time of T.K.'s admission, an evaluation 
period of three days was approved, but the chart does not demonstrate continuing grave disability 
after that three-day period. R., Ex. 1, p. 12,1:15 -p. 13,1:21; p. 14,1:18 -p. 17,1:24; p. 44, l:11 
-p. 56,1:17; Ex. 5, pp. 19,21; Ex. 11, pp. 5-6. Certainly, the last two days of T.K.'s stay, which 
were attributed solely to discharge placement planning, did not meet the criteria for inpatient 
psychiatric care or even the general definition of medical necessity in IDAPA 16.03.09.003.040: 
Medical Necessity. A service is medically necessary if: 
a. It is reasonably calculated to prevent, diagnose, or treat 
conditions in the client that endanger life, cause pain, or cause 
functionally significant deformity or malfunction; and 
b. There is no other equally effective course of treatment available 
or suitable for the client requesting the service which is more 
conservative or substantially less costly. 
The hearing officer's Preliminary Orders affirming the Department's reimbursement 
decisions in these three cases in sum were based on substantial evidence in the record and should 
be upheld. 
B. Medicaid Providers Do Not Have A Right At The Agency Hearing T o  Cross- 
Examine The QIO Peer Reviewer Who  Reviewed The Medical Record In Question 
On Behalf O f  The Agency. 
The district court struck all comments in the records reflecting the findings and 
conclusions of the peer-review psychiatrists because KMC did not have an opportunity to cross- 
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examine them. R., Memorandum Decision & Order on Appeal (Memorandum), p. 270. The 
district court based its action on the notion that Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 US 254 (1970) "requires 
the comments allegedly made by said 'unnamed' witness must be stricken from the record." Id. 
The district court has misapplied Goldberg. Both 42 CFR §§ 43 1.200, et seq. and Goldberg are 
concerned with ensuring due process protections for medical assistance or welfare recipients. 
I .  Goldberg does not afford the same protections ?so providers as it does to 
beneficiaries. 
As stated in Goldberg, the benefits these recipients get are a matter o f  entitlement and, as 
such, due process applies when those benefits are reduced or terminated. Goldberg has never 
been extended to suggest that Medicaid providers are entitled to Medicaid payments and are thus 
entitled to the same due process protections as Medicaid recipients. As discussed below, 
Medicaid providers have little or no interest in Medicaid provider status or payments protected 
by due process. 
42 CFR $3  43 1.200, et seq. is contained in Title 42, Chapter IV, Subchapter C,  Part 43 1 ,  
Subpart E. Subpart E is plainly directed to medical assistance recipients, not to providers, as 
evidenced by its title, "Fair Hearings for Applicants and Recipients." The subpart refers 
throughout only to recipients and applicants for services and never to providers; i.e. it provides 
for fair hearings for people whose claim for assistance is denied or whose services are reduced or 
terminated. No mention is made o f  providers. Section 43 1.201 thus describes the type o f  agency 
action that triggers the fair hearing requirements o f  Subpart E:  "Action means a termination, 
suspension, or reduction of  Medicaid eligibility or covered services." The only action in each o f  
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these cases was a partial denial of Medicaid payment to a provider. The district court's reliance 
on Goldberg and Subpart E for the constitutional protections it seeks to provide to KMC is thus 
misplaced. 
The Department's reviewing psychiatrists' findings and conclusions were summarized in 
Qualis Health's Patient Review Reports. R., Ex. 11, p.6 (T.K.); R, Ex. 7, p. 6, at "appeal review" 
(J.M.); R, Ex. 12, p. 5 (J.G.). The Department's medical witness, Dr. Lehman, testified as to 
those summaries, He noted the psychiatrist's credentials, found that the reviewer reviewed the 
entire medical record, and identified those portions of the medical record that supported the 
reviewer's findings and conclusions. R., Ex. 1, p. 8, 1;15 - p. 9, 11:20; p. 12, 11:15-20; p. 17, 11: 
13-24 (T.K.); R., Ex. 1, pp 69-71 (J.M.); Ex. 1, p. 51,1:5 -p. 52, 1:20; p.58, 1:13 -p. 61, 1:13 
(J.G.). KMC took advantage of the opportunity to inquire of Dr. Lehman about the reviewers' 
comments. R., Ex. 1 (T.K., J.M., J.G.). 
2. Hearsay is admissible in administrative hearings. 
It is noteworthy that in administrative hearings, hearsay is admissible as long as it is the 
kind of evidence commonly relied upon by prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs, or is 
otherwise corroborated by competent evidence in the record. Idaho Code 5 67-5251(1); IDAPA 
16.05.03.134. Dr. Lehman's testimony regarding the peer reviewers in these cases was 
supported by the peer reviewers' written comments themselves and there is no basis in the 
administrative records to question Dr. Lehman's credibility or professional judgment concerning 
the peer reviewers' credentials or comments. 
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3. Even beneficiaries are not entitled to obtain the identity o f a  QIOpeer reviewer. 
The identities of the peer reviewers may not be disclosed without their written consent, 
which was not present in any of these cases. 42 CFR 5 480.133(a)(2)(iii). Even in connection 
with an administrative hearing or review of a beneJiciaiy 's claim, "[tlhe QIO must insure that the 
opinions or judgments of a particular individual or practitioner cannot be identified through the 
materials that are disclosed." 42 CFR 5 480.139(b)(2). The rationale behind a QIO decision 
may be disclosed, only "provided that the opinions or judgments of a particular individual or 
practitioner cannot be identified through the materials that are disclosed." 42 CFR 5 
480.139(b)(l). Partly on this basis, the hearing officer allowed testimony regarding the peer's 
comments. R., Ex. 5, p. 22 (J.G.). 
Further, federal regulations deem information confidential if it "explicitly or implicitly 
identifies an individual patient, practitioner, or reviewer." Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. 
Arkansas Dept. of Human Servs, 444 F.3d 991,995 (gth Cir. 2006), (emphasis original), citing 42 
CFR 5 480.101(b). In Pediatric Specialty Care, one of the plaintiffs successfully moved the 
federal district court to order the Arkansas Foundation for Medical Care (AFMC) to disclose to 
Medicaid providers and recipients the names of physician reviewers who made determinations 
regarding whether and to what extent children were eligible for treatment. Id at 993. AFMC 
contracts with the Arkansas Department of Human Services (ADHS) to review applications for 
Medicaid services. Id. Noting the conflict between the federal district court's order and the 
applicable regulations, the Eighth Circuit reversed, stating: 
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The statute governing disclosure specifically charges HHS with the 
duty to ensure peer review information is kept confidential through 
regulations aimed toward protecting 'the rights and interests of 
patients, health care practitioners, [and] providers of health care.' 
42 U.S.C. 5 1320c-9(a)(2). The regulations effectuate that 
purpose, as they allow disclosure of the identities of peer reviewers 
only after obtaining written consent of the peer reviewer. 42 
C.F.R. 4 480.133(a)(2)(iii). 
Id. at 996. The confidentiality regulations similarly control here. 
That federal regulations limit tightly the disclosure of peer reviewer identities is hardly 
surprising. Few qualified physician specialists would likely be willing to become QIO peer 
reviewers if their identities were to be routinely disclosed. In so doing, they would make 
themselves regularly available for witness preparation, deposition and testimony; take time away 
from their practices; and disclose to their colleagues who is "grading their work." Thus, even if 
KMC were entitled to the same due process protections afforded to beneficiaries, it would still 
not be entitled to know the identity of the QIO peer reviewer without their consent and would 
therefore not have a right to cross-examine the reviewer. 
It is clear, then, that hearsay is permissible in administrative hearings and that federal law 
prohibits disclosure of the identities of peer reviewers without their written consent. It is equally 
clear that Medicaid agencies must rely on their QIO peer reviewers' findings and conclusions in 
making provider reimbursement decisions. 42 USC 3 1320~-7(a); 42 USC $ 1320c-3(a)(2). 
Medicaid agencies can not disclose their QIO peer reviewers' identities without written consent, 
and under those circumstances can not present them at hearing. If those agencies were not abIe to 
rely on the written comments of those peer reviewers and on hearsay testimony regarding those 
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comments, then Medicaid agencies would rarely be able to present evidence as strong as the 
provider's attending physician's comments and testimony and thereby to defend their 
reimbursement decisions, thus frustrating Congress' intent for federal oversight of medical 
assistance spending. 
Consequently, in order for the district court's order striking the peer reviewers' 
comments in these cases to stand, this Court must rule that the federal statutes and regulations 
concerning disclosure of QIO peer reviewer's identities are in conflict with the United States 
Constitution and must therefore fall. The only thing referenced in the district court's 
Memorandum that would supersede federal statutes and regulations is the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment. However, the due process protections discussed in Goldberg -- the sole 
authority relied upon by the district court - and 42 CFR §§ 431.200, et seq. apply to recipients 
1 rather than providers. 
4. A provider's cross-examination of a QI0 peer reviewer is not a substantial right. 
As stated in the Idaho Code: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this 
section, agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of 
the appellant have been prejudiced. 
Idaho Code 8 67-5279(4). No substantial right of KMC has been prejudiced by the Department's 
payment decisions in these cases, because Medicaid providers never have a protectable property 
interest in Medicaid provider status or payments, and have no liberty interest in reimbursement 
cases. 
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The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of withholding Medicare 
payments in the context of a due process challenge in Geriatrics, Inc. v. Harris, 640 F.2d 262 
0 C i ,  1981) In Geriatrics, Geriatrics, Inc., a Colorado Medicaid nursing home provider 
doing business as "Evantide of Lakewood Nursing Home," had obtained a preliminary injunction 
from the district court enjoining the Colorado Department of Health from terminating Medicaid 
funding of the nursing home prior to a hearing to ascertain whether the home was in compliance 
with federal and state regulations. Evantide argued that it had an expectation of continued 
participation in the Medicaid program and that such expectation was a property interest, 
protected under due process. Id. at 264. The court of appeals ruled that, "A protectable property 
interest must be an interest secured by statute or legal rule or through a mutually explicit 
understanding." Id. ((citing Leis v. Flynt, 439 US. 438, 441-42, 99 S.Ct. 698, 700-01, 58 L.Ed.2d 
71 7 (1979).) The Geriatrics court ruled that Evantide had no such property interest and that 
there was no statutory or constitutional requirement that Evantide be granted a hearing prior to 
termination of funding. Id. at 265. 
Evantide argued further that termination of funding would force it to close and that it had 
a significant financial interest in retaining certification as a provider. 640 F.2d at 265. The Tenth 
Circuit responded that Evantide was not an intended beneficiary of the Medicaid program; that 
its financial need for government assisted patients was incidental to the purpose and design of 
the program; and that, though financially difficult, it could still operate, rendering care to private- 
pay patients. Id. (citing Town Court Nursing Ctr, Inc. v. Beal, 586 F.2d 266 (3d Cir., 1978); and 
Case v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 602,607 (2d Cir., 1975).) Like Evantide, KMC is not an intended 
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beneficiary of the Medicaid program, and has no protectable property interest in Medicaid 
payments that is secured by statute, rule or mutually explicit understanding. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has also addressed the question of whether a 
Medicaid provider has a property or liberty interest in Medicaid payments. The court stated: 
. . . [Tlhe First and Tenth Circuits have provided reasoned analyses 
for their conclusion that physicians do not have a property interest 
in continued participation in Medicare. We choose to follow the 
reasoning of those circuits and hold that plaintiffs do not possess a 
property interest in continued participation in Medicare, Medicaid 
or the federally funded state health care programs. 
Erichon v. United States ex re[. Dep't. ofHeaNh and Human Services, 67 F.3d 858, 862 (9'h Cir. 
The Erickson Court did hold that a liberty interest was at stake in that case. However, the 
facts giving rise to a liberty interest in that case are in contrast to the facts of the case at bar. In 
Erickson, the petitioner had been excluded from participation in the Medicare program after 
having been convicted of Medicare fraud, and had successfblly petitioned the U.S. District court 
for a restraining order, preventing such exclusion until the Ninth Circuit could consider his case. 
Ultimately, the court concluded that the petitioner had received any process that was due, 
reversed the district court and dissolved the restraining order, allowing the exclusion to go 
forward. 67 F.3d at 864. In determining whether a liberty interest was at stake in Erickson, the 
court adopted the test announced in Vanelli v. Reynolds School Dist. No. 7, 667 F.2d 773, 777 
(gth Cir. 1982). The test states as follows: 
The procedural protections of due process apply if the accuracy of 
the charge is contested, there is some public disclosure of the 
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charge, and it is made in connection with the termination of 
employment or the alteration of some right or status recognized by 
[I law. 
Erickson, 67 F.3d at 862 (citing Vanelli, 667 F.2d at 777-78.) The court under this test ruled 
that the accuracy of the charge was contested, since an appeal was pending; and that the 
petitioner's status as a Medicare provider had been altered by the exclusion. Id, at 863. Under 
these circumstances, it found that a liberty interest was at stake in that case. Id. 
In contrast to the petitioner in Erickson, KMC has not been charged with, let alone been 
convicted of any crime in connection with this case. The Department has merely determined that 
a portion of each stay in question is not reimbursable by Medicaid. No penalty was imposed and 
KMC is free to continue operating and providing Medicaid services. The Department has done 
nothing to alter KMC's status as a Medicaid provider such as termination of the Provider 
Agreement or exclusion from the Medicaid program. There is no dispute as to the accuracy of a 
charge, as no charge has been made. KMC therefore has neither a property nor a liberty interest 
in the Medicaid payments which it seeks and is accordingly unable to substantiate a due process 
claim. As a necessary corollary, KMC has no due process right to cross-examine QIO peer 
reviewers 
C. Determination Of The Availability Of Less Intensive Services Is Not Part Of The 
QIO Review Function. 
The district court erred in striking the testimony of the Department's only witness. That 
testimony was stricken solely on the basis of the witness' lack of familiarity with services in the 
area that were less intensive than inpatient psychiatric care. The witness was the first reviewing 
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physician for the QIO; he is not an employee of the Department or KMC, and knowledge 
concerning the availability of less intensive services in the area of the Hospital is not part of the 
QIO review function. R., Ex. I ,  p. 83, 11:4-19 (J.G.). For purposes of admission, determinations 
of the availability of less intensive services in the area are made by the Department. IDAPA 
16.03.09.079.01 .b.i.. Determination of the availability of such resources during continued stay is 
a routine part of KMC's discharge planning responsibilities. R., Ex. 1; Ex. 11, pp. 19,54 (T.K.). 
In these cases, KMC made no showing of attempts to discharge the patients to a less 
acute care facility prior to the actual discharge date for patients J.M. and J.G. and attempted 
discharge in the T.K. matter only after 36 days of inpatient care. Delay of discharge due to 
difficulties in securing placement is not a component of medical necessity for purposes of 
Medicaid reimbursement. 42 USC 5 1320c-3(a)(l); IDAPA 16.03.09.003.040; 16.03.09.079. 
In the case of J.G., the witness and the peer reviewer were in fact aware of a less 
intensive care alternative, and the alternative was the detention center where the patient was 
returned. R., Ex. 12, pp. 4-5. Likewise, in the case of J.M., the witness and the peer reviewer 
knew that the patient was to be discharged to his mother's care. R., Ex. 7, pp. 5-6, 108. The 
district court should have considered the testimony of the Department's witness. 
D. KMC Failed To Show Good Cause As To Why It Should Be Allowed To Present 
New Evidence. 
IDAPA 16.05.03.13 1 appropriately requires the hearing officer to consider only 
information available to the Department at the time it made its decision. This is the only 
information pertinent to the action on appeal. The rule further provides that the hearing officer 
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shall remand the case if the appellant offers additional relevant information that was not 
available to the Department when the decision in question was made; and the appellant shows 
good cause for not making the information available before the decision was rendered. This 
provision allows for the resolution of the matter at the lowest possible level within the 
Department, and allows for review by the appropriate experts before the parties expend further 
time and money on the appeal process. 
KMC failed to provide any indication in any of these cases as to what additional relevant 
information it wished to offer. There was no offer of proof in any of the cases, and no effort was 
made to establish good cause for not having provided additional information prior to the 
Department's decision on reimbursement. Finally, KMC did not request remand. R., generally 
(T.K., J.M., J.G.); R., Ex. 5, p. 19, fn. 4 (T.K.); R., Ex. 5, p. 22, fn. 9 (J.M.); R., Ex. 5, p. 23 
(J.G.). 
Nor is it apparent that the hearing officer excluded information from KMC in any of 
these cases, although she stated that some of the information I(MC's testimony had not been 
available at the time the Department made its decision. This dictum in footnote 8 of the 
Preliminary Order in J.G.'s case, for example, is actually erroneous, since the hearing officer 
evaluated that testimony in detail in her discussion of the facts, and found no good cause for 
failing to provide information earlier. R., Ex. 5, p.23. Again, KMC has not identified any 
excluded evidence. KMC's explanation and interpretation of its records are precisely the focus 
of the appeal hearing, and do not rise to new evidence. Any new facts in these cases that would 
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justify continuing stays would contradict the medical records. It is inconceivable that anything 
significant would have been omitted. 
E. Third Party Standing Is Irrelevant And Unsupported In These Cases. 
The district court discussed the concept of "associated" or third-party standing at length 
and deemed it "dispositive of this case." R., p. 267. However, the court never clearly stated how 
its finding impacted these cases. Whether KMC has standing to assert the rights of its patients is 
irrelevant in these matters, since the aggrieved party is KMC. The only question presented at 
hearing was whether the Department's reimbursement decisions were justified. No patient was 
denied services, since they were all discharged before KMC ever requested reimbursement 
review, and none of the patients can ever be held liable for payment. IDAPA 16.03.09.079.08.c. 
Thus, in reimbursement cases such as these, the patients themselves do not have standing. 
KMC was the aggrieved party in all of these matters and had full opportunity to represent 
itself. The only "injury" to patients the district court pointed to was, "[ijf the provider was 
prohibited from bringing such an appeal, the providers may decide in future to not accept 
Medicaid patients." R, p. 269. The records in these cases are devoid of any evidence about 
whether KMC or other providers may sometime in the future decide not to take anymore 
Medicaid patients. Given that silence, the records are no less devoid of evidence that such 
reluctance would have a future effect on the three patients hospitalized here. The district court's 
perceived potential injury is too speculative to support a conclusion that associated standing 
exists in these cases, even if such a conclusion could logically affect the outcome of the cases. 
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F. The Requirement Of Documentation In IDAPA 16.03.09.079.05 Does Not Conniet 
With Federal Law. 
The district court ruled that IDAPA 16.03.09.079.05 (Idaho Administrative Code, July 
2005, Volume 4) conflicts with 42 CFR 5 441.152 in requiring that providers present 
documentation sufficient to demonstrate that criteria for an extended length of stay are met. R., 
p. 271. The district court further stated that the documentation requirement in IDAPA 
16.03.09.079.05 "lays the groundwork for arbitrary decision making." R., p. 271. 
The documentation requirements in IDAPA 16.03.09.079.05 are not in conflict with 42 
CFR $5 441,150, et seq. The federal regulations do not prohibit states Erom interpreting "certify" 
to be synonymous with documenting the evidence in the medical record to the extent necessary 
to demonstrate medical necessity for care. Since Medicaid and QIO reviewers are not typically 
located on the Hospital premises, states have no way of performing their federally required 
oversight duties if providers are not required to provide documentation sufficient to demonstrate 
medical necessity. The documentation required is clearly spelled out in IDAPA 16.03.09.079. If 
documentation requirements were not spelled out in rule, hospitals would be free to interpret 
"certify" in any way they chose. Such a result would indeed lay the groundwork for arbitrary 
decision making, leading necessarily to lack of uniformity in demonstration by hospitals of 
medical necessity, and to a complete inability by QIOs and Medicaid agencies to perform 
utilization oversight functions required by federal law. 
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G. This Court Should Award The Department Its Attorney Fees And Costs, In Light 
Of The Facts Of These Cases And In Light Of The Applicable Law. 
The Department asserts it claim to attorney fees pursuant to I.A.R. 41. "In any civil 
action the court may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party ... as defined in Rule 
54(d)(l)(B), when provided for by any statute or contract." I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). Attorney fees are 
provided for in Idaho Code (i 12-1 17. 
Idaho Code (i 12-1 17 provides that attorney fees may be awarded whenever one of the 
parties to a legal action is a political subdivision or administrative agency and where the court 
finds "that the party against whom the judgment was rendered acted without a reasonable basis 
in fact or law." Based on the substantial evidence in the records supporting the Preliminary 
Orders and on the controlling state and federal law, particularly in the Ninth Circuit, with respect 
to the issues presented by KMC in its petitions to the district court, there is no reasonable basis in 
law or fact for KMC to have petitioned from the hearing officer's decisions these matters. The 
Department is therefore entitled to attorney fees and costs, pursuant to Idaho Code (i 12-1 17, and 
IRCP 54(d) and (e). Daw v. Sch. Dist. No. 91 Bd. of Trustees., 136 Idaho 806, 41 P.3d 234 
(2001). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The district court's judgments should be reversed, and these matters should be remanded 
with instructions to dismiss the petitions for judicial review. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Dated: May 22,2008 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
By: 
Deputy Attorney General 
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